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Summary  findings
One of the best documented empirical facts in economic  between managerial and information-theoretic
research has been the positive relationship between  approaches since both approaches predict a negative
internal finance and cash flows - the sum of retained  relationship between dividend payout ratios and capital
earnings and depreciation  - and capital expenditures  expenditures.
and investment. But disputes about the analytical basis  But one can distinguish between managerial and
for the cash flow theory have been largely unresolved.  information-theoretic approaches using such variables as
There are two distinct approaches to the cash flow  size, exchange listings, and the ratio of R&D to sales and
theory of investment: the managerial and information-  make contrasting predictions about the firm's reliance on
theoretic approaches.  The premise of the managerial  internal finance for capital expenditures.
approach is that managers are primarily interested in  The evidence shows that the firm's observed reliance
maximizing the growth rate of the firm. The premise of  of capital expenditures on internal finance is driven by
the information-theoretic  approach is that managers try  managerial rather than information-theoretic
to maximize shareholder value.  considerations.
Using a panel of U.S. manufacturing firms (1972-90),  While no current research directly distinguishes
Samuel tries to distinguish between these two approaches  between managerial and information-theoretic
on the basis of observed firm characteristics. The results  approaches, preliminary evidence seems to favor the
suggest that firms rely on internal finance for capital  managerial approach. And even though the stock market
expenditures because of managerial considerations rather  may play a limited role as a source of finance, policy
than information-theoretic considerations.  initiatives to reform the financial sector and develop
The principal shortcoming of the information-  capital markets are likely to enhance the overall
theoretic approach is its reliance on dividend practices  efficiency of the resource allocation process in the
as the decisive criterion for studying firm heterogeneity.  economy.
But dividend practices are incapable of distinguishing
This paper - a product of the Operations Policy Group, Operations Policy Department - is part of a larger effort in the
department to. Copies of the paper are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433.
Please contact  Cherian  Samuel, room  MC10-362,  telephone  202-473-0802,  fax  202-522-3253,  Internet  address
csamuel@worldbank.org.  October 1996.  (34 pages)
The Policy Research  Working Paper Series disseminates  the findings  of work in progress  to encourage  the exchange  of ideas  about
development  issues.  An objective  of the  series  is to get the  findings  out  quickly,  even  if the  presentations  are  less  than  fully polished.  The
papers  carry the names  of the authors  and should  be used  and cited  accordingly.  The  findings,  interpretations,  and conclusions  are the
authors'  oun and should  not be  attributed to the World  Bank,  its Executive  Board  of Directors,  or any of its member  countries.





*I like to thank Drew Lyon, Plutarchos  Sakellaris,  Luis Guasch, John Wallis, and Martin Loeb
for their comments  on an earlier version of this paper.Internal  rmance  and Investment:  Another look
The positive relationship between internal finance/cash flows--the sum of  retained
earnings and depreciation--and  capital expenditures/investment  is one of the best documented
empirical  facts  in economic  research. However, the analytical  basis for this positive  relationship
has been a  matter of great dispute and a largely unresolved issue.  Briefly speaking, the
underlying  cash flow theory of investment  that leads to the positive relationship  consists of two
distinct approaches,  viz. managerial and information-theoretic  approaches  to investment. This
paper attempts to distinguish between these two approaches on the basis of observed firm
characteristics, based on a panel of U.S. manufacturing  firms for the 1972-1990  period taken
from Standard and Poor's  COMPUSTAT  database.  The results suggest that the observed
reliance of firms on internal finance for capital expenditures  is due to managerial  rather than
information-theoretic  considerations. The paper is organized into two main sections.  Section
I considers  the analytical  issues and section  II presents the empirical  evidence  and discusses  the
implications  for developing  countries.
I
Investment  theories and the role of finance
It is well-known  that prior to the ascendancy  of the Modigliani-Miller  (1958) theorems
and the neoclassical theory of investment, liquidity theory of investment had replaced the
accelerator theory of investment  as the leading explanation  of investment  decisions of firms.'
' The neoclassical  theory  of investment  is due  to Jorgenson  and  associates  (1963,  1966,  1967,  1971),
primarily  based  on the neoclassical  theory  of optimal  capital  accumulation.  The liquidity  theory  is due
to Meyer  and  Kuh (1957),  Duesenberry  (1958),  Kuh  (1963)  and others. The accelerator  theory,  the
oldest  of the investment  models,  is due  to Clark  (1917),  Chenery  (1952),  Koyck  (1954),  Eisner  (1964)
and  others. The managerial  nd information-theoretic  approaches  to investment  can  be considered  as the
versions  of the liquidity  theory  and  therefore  fall under  the rubric  of cash  flow  theory  of investment.
2There were at least two justifications for the liquidity theory: (i) realized profits measure
expected  profits and investment  is governed  by profit expectations  (Tinbergen, (1938));  and (ii)
investment may be constrained  by the supply of funds (Meyer and Kuh (1957)), Meyer and
Glauber (1964), Kuh (1963), Dusenberry (1958), and Meyer and Strong (1990)).
In the strong version of the liquidity  theory, the financial  constraint  operates at all times;
the cost of funds schedule  becomes  inelastic where internal funds are exhausted. In the weaker
version, financial  constraint  operates at low rates of capacity utilization  while extreme pressure
on capacity may result in the use of outside sources of finance.
The neoclassical  theory of investment is based in part on the Modigliani-Miller  (1958)
theorems in finance.  The neoclassical  view assumes that as long as the firm has profitable
investments with returns above the cost of capital, the firm can obtain sufficient funds to
undertake them.  Consequently,  internal and external finance are viewed  as substitutes; firms
could use external finance to smooth investment  when internal finance fluctuates. In a broader
sense, the neoclassical  view also implies a complete dichotimization  of the real and financial
decisions  faced by the firm.
On the other hand, cash flow theories  of investment  emphasize  financing  hierarchy  faced
by the firm and therefore the crucial role of cash flows in determining  capital expenditures. 2
For  instance, the managerial and information-theoretic  approaches to investment explicitly
consider capital market imperfections that raise  the cost of  external finance; managerial
2 According  to the  financing  hierarchy/pecking  order  hypothesis,  the  firm's preferred  ordering  of  the
sources  of finance  is: (i) internal  finance;  (ii) external  debt; and (iii) new equity. See Koch (1943),
Donaldson  (1961),  Meyer  and Strong  (1990)  and  others  for evidence.
3discretion considerations  lead to a similar outcome  in the managerial  theory of investment. 3
Therefore, cash flow is irrelevant  for all other models  of investment. 4 In particular, the
accelerator, modified  neoclassical,  and Q models  of investment  make no particular predictions
regarding the source of finance. To the extent that these theories are based on the assumption
of profit maximization,  they  can be regarded  as consistent  with the neoclassical  approach. Given
these  considerations,  it is useful  to distinguish  between  the managerial  and information-theoretic
approaches.
Managerial theory of investment
The managerial  approach  to corporate  behavior  directly challenges the assumption of
profit  maximization by  the firm and  instead postulates  other objectives  such as sales,  staff,
emoluments, market  share etc.  for managers. 5 Given the separation of ownership and control
(management),  managerial  behavior  is  discretionary  and  constrained  rather  weakly  by
shareholder-owner interests on the one hand, and by competitive market conditions on the other.6
The key result of the managerial approach is that firms aim for greater output levels and
faster  growth  than  is  consistent  with  maximizing  the  current  stock  market  value  of  the
3  Financing  hierarchy may also be based on transactions  costs, tax advantages,  costs of financial
distress etc., though these are likely to be  less important than agency problems and asymmetric
information.
4 See Chirinko (1993) for a comprehensive  survey of the current state of research on investment
theory, with particular emphasis  on the Q-theoretic  models.
I Strictly speaking,  the managerial  theory of investment  can be thought  of as being made up of two
types of approaches--managerial  capitalism and agency theory.  Baumol (1959, 1967), Marris (1963,
1964), Grabowski  and Mueller (1972) and others are examples  of the managerial  capitalism approach.
The agency  cost approach  focusses  on contracting  aspects  within  the overall framework  of the principal-
agent model and is associated  with Jensen and Meckling  (1976) and others.
6 The literature on the separation  of ownership  and control began with Berle and Means (1932).
4corporation, taken as a proxy for stockholder  welfare.  The extent of managerial  discretion to
do this depends upon a minimum profit constraint imposed by the capital market, or upon
sustaining  a market value high enough  to forestall  a disciplinary  takeover  bid in the market for
corporate control.
In the managerial  theory of the firm, the fundamental  determinant  of investment  is the
availability  of intemal finance. Managers are envisaged as pushing investment  programs to a
point where their marginal rate of return is below the level that would maximize stockholder
welfare; in other words, managers indulge in overinvestment.  For  these purposes, intemal
finance is particularly  favored since they are the most accessible  part of the capital market and
most amenable  to managerial  desires for growth.  In other words, professional  managers  may
avoid relying on the external finance because it would subject them to the discipline of the
extemal capital  market. In contrast,  the level of cash flow  is irrelevant  for the firm's investment
decisions  in neoclassical  theory; what matters is the cost of capital.
While managers  want to maximize  their utility, shareholders  want them to maximize  the
value  of the firm.  Various control  mechanisms  like the board of directors, market for corporate
control, and large shareholders  may limit this divergence  of interests.  Managers who can be
replaced by the  board,  through hostile takeovers, or  due to  pressure from large outside
shareholders  should  be attentive  to shareholder  concems. In some  firms however, these control
mechanisms  may  be ineffective. Their managers  can maximize  their utility  with impunity. Such
managers  are said to be "entrenched".
Holding  constant the manager's absolute investment  in the firm, increases in the fraction
of firm financed  by debt increases  the manager's share of the equity and mitigate  the loss from
5the conflict between the manager and the shareholders.  Moreover, as pointed out by Jensen
(1986), since debt commits the firm to pay out cash, it reduces the amount of  "free"cash
available  to managers  to engage  in the type of pursuits mentioned  above. This mitigation  of the
conflicts between managers and  equity holders constitutes the benefit of  debt financing.
Grossman  and Hart (1982)  points  out that if bankruptcy  is costly for managers, because  they  lose
control or reputation, then debt can create an incentive  for managers  to work harder, consume
fewer perquisites, make better investment  decisions, etc., because this behavior reduces the
probability of bankruptcy.
Information-theoretic  approach
In asymmetric information  models, firm managers  or insiders are assumed to possess
private  information about  the  characteristics of  the  firm's  return  stream or  investment
opportunities. Myers and Majluff (1984) showed that, if outside suppliers of capital are less
well-informed  than  insiders about the value of the firm's assets, equity  may be mispriced by the
market.  In particular, the market may associate new equity issues with low-quality  firms.  If
firms are required to finance  new projects  by issuing equity, underpricing  may  be so severe that
new investors capture more than the Net Present Value (NPV) of the new project, resulting  in
a net loss to existing shareholders. In this case, the project will be rejected even if its NPV is
positive.  This underinvestment  can be avoided if the firm can finance the new project using a
security that is not so severely undervalued  by the market. For example, internal funds and/or
riskless  debt  involve  no undervaluation,  and therefore, will be preferred to equity. Myers (1984)
refers to this as a "pecking  order" theory of financing,  i.e., that capital structure  will be driven
by firms' desire to finance  new investments,  first internally, then with low-risk debt, and finally
6with equity only as a last resort.
Based on  these considerations, the information-theoretic  approach to  the  study of
investment  also implies a positive relationship  between cash flows and investment;  in fact, this
positive relationship is  also  seen  as  evidence of  liquidity constraints faced  by  firms.
Consequently,  external finance and internal finance are not perfect substitutes  for the firm, as
predicted  by the Modigliani-Miller  (1958) theorems and the neoclassical  theory of investment.
Therefore, in  a  world of  heterogenous firms,  financing constraints would influence the
investment  decisions  of firms. In particular, investment  may depend on financial  factors, such
as the availability  of internal finance, access to new debt or equity finance, or the functioning
of particular credit markets.
Fazzari et al. (1988) have shown that the issue of firm heterogeneity  can be explored
further by classifying  firms on the basis of retention  practices which  identify  firms that are most
likely to face capital market constraints due to informational  problems.  The rationale for the
classification is  as  follows; if  internal and external finance are  nearly perfect substitutes,
retention  practices should  reveal little about investment  activity by the firm. The availability  of
internal funds should  constrain  investment  if and only if the firm has to pay a premium for new
debt or equity finance.  The results reported in Fazzari et al.  (1988) indicate a substantially
greater sensitivity  of investment  to cash flows in firms that retain nearly all of their income.
This statistically  and economically  significant  difference  was also found to be robust to a wide
variety of model specifications  and estimation techniques.
Hoshi et al.  (1991) adopted a similar procedure by dividing a  sample of Japanese
companies  into two groups according to whether the firm had a close institutional  relationship
7with a bank or not.  The rationale for doing this was that liquidity constraints arising from
asymmetric information  may be less important where the bank maintains  a close relationship
with the firm.  They found that the q ratio--the ratio of market value of the firm to  the
replacement  cost of capital--was  more significant,  and cash flow less significant, for the firms
that were closely related to banks. 7
Discussion
(i) In the cash flow models of investment,  internal finance is generally viewed as a constraint
on the volume of investment expenditures rather  than as a determinant  of the optimal capital
stock.  Therefore,  there is no role for capital-labor substitution in cash flow models, unlike the
neoclassical model of investment.
(ii) It is often difficult to distinguish between the role of cash flow as a measure of the expected
profitability  of investment  from its role as a measure of the availability  of funds for investment.
It is this latter aspect  that is generally  intended  for measurement,  and through  which the liquidity
effect is thought to operate.  In the information-theoretic  approach  for instance, an increase in
cash flow would increase investment;  but, since increases in cash flow are likely to be highly
correlated with increases in profitability, it is hard to tell if the increased investment is not
primarily the result of increased profitability rather than increased cash flow.  One solution--
proposed by Fazzari et al. (1988)--is to use the Q ratio as a measure of the expected profitability
7 However,  it should  be pointed  out  that  this evidence  is consistent  with  the predictions  of managerial
theory  as well. In the case  of firms  that  maintain  a close  relationship  with  banks,  agency  costs  are  likely
to be lower because of closer monitoring  by banks.  For these firms with low agency costs, cash flow
is likely to be less significant;  in other words, the reliance  on internal  finance  is likely to be low for these
firms with close relationship  with banks. Therefore, the finding  that cash flow is less significant  for firms
that maintain  a close  relationship  with banks  is consistent  with information-theoretic  as well as managerial
approaches  to investment.
8and cash flow as a measure of the availability of funds.
(iii) Even though the information-theoretic approach assumes the prevalence of capital market
constraints and therefore the preference of firms for intemal finance, it is cast in a neoclassical
framework  with  the usual  assumption that  managers act in the interests  of  shareholders  and
maximize profits.  On the other hand, managerial theory is based on the premise that managers
have objectives  different  from  those  of  shareholders.  Managers  do  not  maximize  profits/
shareholder wealth, but instead maximize the growth rate/size of the firm and are probably more
concemed about managerial perquisites.
(iv) In the information-theoretic approach, it is assumed that funds are invested at rates of return
above shareholder opportunity costs.  This is an outcome of the assumption that managers act
in the interests of shareholders.  In the managerial model however,  investment could take place
at rates of returns  below opportunity cost.'  This is because managers have objectives that are
different from those of shareholders.  Therefore,  the policy implications of the two approaches
are  drastically  different.  In particular,  overinvestment  by  managers  is not  an  issue in  the
information-theoretic approach, while it is a matter of central concern in the managerial theory.
(v)  In  the  information-theoretic  view,  a  financing  hierarchy  exists  because  of  asymmetric
information between managers and outside suppliers of finance.  As demonstrated by Myers and
Majluff (1984), firms are faced with a skeptical capital market that pays less for new equity than
its true value, since the market cannot fully learn the expected return on the firm's  investment.
In the managerial view however,  financing hierarchy exists because managers can use internal
8  See Mueller and Reardon (1993) for recent evidence. Brainard et al. (1980) also found that
substantial  volume of investment  in the U.S. economy  had been undertaken  below the opportunity  cost
of capital, which is inconsistent  with the predictions  of the neoclassical  theory.
9funds at their discretion and thus implicitly  face a low opportunity  cost on them.
(vi) The central issue in the managerial  theory of investment  is the prevalence of managerial
discretion;  internal finance  is important  for investment  decisions  precisely because of this since
managers are averse to the dictates of the external capital market.  On the other hand, the
information-theoretic  approach  to investment  emphasizes  the role of asymmetries  in information
and essentially views managerial  discretion as an aspect of asymmetric  information; internal
finance is important for investment  because of the prevalence  of asymmetric  information. The
common  ground  between  the two approaches  with regard to this issue lies in recognizing  the fact
that it is the separation  of ownership  and control that generates information  asymmetries  in the
first instance, which in turn leads to discretionary managerial  behavior. 9
Given these considerations,  the discussion in this paper is focussed on distinguishing
between the managerial  and information-theoretic  approaches  to capital  expenditure  decisions  at
the  firm-level.  Above all,  this distinction between managerial and information-theoretic
approaches  is important  in addressing  the empirical  issue of why  internal finance  is so important
for the firm's investment  decisions.
It  is interesting to note that,  starting with the work of Fazzari et al.  (1988), the
consensus in  the  literature on  the  cash  flow theory of  investment seems to  emphasize
asymmetries of information as the principal force behind the observed positive relationship
between internal finance and investment. However, the present study emphasizes  the fact that
the cash flow theory of investment  is also driven by managerial  considerations  and therefore  tries
9 Stultz  (1990)  presents  a model  in which  managerial  discretion  and  information  asymmetries  exist
simultaneously.
10to distinguish  between the two approaches  on the basis of observed firm characteristics. This
is an important  point of departure for the present study from previous research.
Additionally, while earlier  studies distinguished between information-theoretic  and
managerial approaches  on the basis of different firm attributes, firm attributes have been so
chosen in  the  present study that  they will  generate contrasting predictions and  help to
discriminate  between  information-theoretic  and managerial  approaches. For instance, Oliner  and
Rudebusch  (1993)  used age, exchange  listing, and stock  trading behavior  by insiders  as proxies
for the information-theoretic  approach  and the share of outstanding  common  stock  controlled  by
the firm's  board of directors and the percentage of outside shares controlled by the twenty
largest outside  shareholders  as proxies for the managerial  (agency  cost) approach  and found that
the source of financing hierarchy faced by the firm is due to information-theoretic  rather than
agency cost considerations.
Blanchard et  al.  (1994) distinguished between the  perfect capital markets model,
asymmetric  information  model, and agency  model  by looking at a sample  of eleven U. S. firms
that received a cash windfall  which  did not change  its investment  opportunity  set. By evaluating
the behavior  of these firms with regard to various activities such as investment  in own lines of
business, diversification,  divestiture, dividends  or open market share repurchases, managerial
compensation,  and long-term debt, Blachard et al. (1994) find that the evidence was broadly
inconsistent  with the perfect capital markets model. Also, the results need to be considerably
stretched to fit the asymmetric information model in which managers act in the interest of
shareholders.  However, the evidence supports the agency model of managerial  behavior, in
which managers  try to ensure the long-term survival  and independence  of firms with themselves
11at the helm.
Hubbard  et al. (1995)  take  a somewhat  different  approach  to distinguish  between  Jensen's
(1986) "free cash flow models" (managerial  approach)  and the information-theoretic  approach.
They contrast the behavior  of a set of mature  firms in their sample  with other firms and find that
the investment  decisions  of firms are well described  by a standard Euler equation. Therefore,
Hubbard  et al. (1995)  conclude  that while the Jensen-style  agency model may well  be important
in explaining  other uses of the firm's resources, it does not appear to be important  for business
fixed investment.
Aspects  of rwm heterogeneity
Given the different  motivations of the managerial and information-theoretic  approaches
to investment for emphasizing the firm's  reliance on internal finance for capital expenditures,
the two theories hold different predictions for firms with different characteristics.  However, it
should be noted that, in the discussion that follows, no attempt is made to distinguish between
the debt and equity components of external finance based on firm characteristics.  This is due
to the fact that both information-theoretic and  managerial approaches posit the existence of a
financing  hierarchy wherein the cost of equity is higher than the cost of debt.'°
The fundamental  distinction  made between firms in this paper is in terms of mature vs
non-mature  (dynamic)  firms.  Broadly  speaking,  mature firms are old, slow-growing  firms with
limited  investment  opportunities;  in contrast, dynamic  firms are young, fast-growing  firms with
abundant  investment  opportunities.  As  discussed  in  greater  detail  below,  observable  firm
10 The effect of information  asymmetries  on the market for new shares is examined  by Myers and
Majluff  (1984)  through an extension  of Akerloff's (1970)  lemons  argument. Similarly,  Stiglitz  and Weiss
(1981) have shown that debt markets are also vulnerable to adverse selection problems because of
asymmetric  information  about risk characteristics  and default probabilities.
12characteristics  have been used to classify firms into mature/dynamic  categories.  The basic
prediction  of the information-theoretic  approach  is that information  problems  are likely to be the
least for mature firms and the most for dynamic firms.  In contrast, the managerial  approach
implies that agency problems are likely to be the most for mature firms and the least for
dynamic  firms. Further, arguments  presented  earlier imply that firms that are subject  to greater
incidence  of information  problems  and agency  costs are likely to be more dependent  on internal
finance than external finance.  In what follows, firms are divided into the mature/non-mature
categories  based on characteristics  such as size, dividend  practices, exchange  listing, and R and
D to sales ratio; these predictions are discussed in detail in the context of a cross-section of
firms."' The predicted  relationship  between  internal finance and capital expenditures  for firms
with different characteristics, based on managerial and information-theoretic  approaches, is
summarized  in table 1. The rationale  for these  predictions  is discussed  in greater detail below." 2
(a) size: Gertler (1988)  has argued that information-based  financial  constraints  are likely to have
a greater impact on small firms than large firms, partly because large firms tend to be mature
and have more  credible relations  with providers of finance. The information-theoretic  approach
therefore implies that small firms are likely to be most dependent  on internal finance and least
dependent  on external finance.
" Other  firm  characteristics  like  growth  rate  of sales  and  the  price-earnings  ratio  were  also  considered
in splitting  the sample;  this was  not  pursued  since  they  generate  equivalent  firm  behavior  from  the point
of view  of information-theoretic  and managerial  approaches  and therefore  not useful  in distinguishing
between  them.
12 It should  be noted  that Fazzari  et al.  (1988)  used  only  dividend  practices  to distinguish  between
firms.  Also, they assumed  that internal  finance  is important  for investment  because  of asymmetric
information  considerations  rather  than  managerial  discretion  aspects.  Unlike  the  present  study,  no attempt
was  made  to distinguish  between  information-theoretic  and  agency  cost  approaches  based  on observable
firm  characteristics.
13On the other hand, the ownership  of small firms is likely to be more concentrated,  with
managers  holding significant  blocks of stock, which  in turn could mitigate  agency  problems  and
align shareholder and managerial interests better.  Therefore, managerial theory implies that
small firms are likely to be least dependent  on internal finance and most dependent  on external
finance.
These arguments are essentially  reversed in the case of large firms.
(b) dividend-practices:  According to the information-theoretic  approach, observed retention
practices and therefore dividend  practices, provide a useful criterion for identifying  firms that
are likely to face relatively  high costs of external finance. Fazzari et al.  (1988)  have shown that
if the cost of external finance is significantly  higher than that of internal finance, the effect is
likely to be greatest for firms that retain most of their income and pay out little dividends. If
the cost disadvantage  is only slight, then retention (dividend)  practices should  reveal little about
financing  practices, or investment  behavior.  Therefore, firms that pay out the least dividends
are the ones that are likely to face the most amount of information problems and liquidity
constraints, and hence are likely to be most dependent  on internal finance and least dependent
on external finance.
According to  the  managerial theory,  since  managers are  primarily interested in
maximizing  the growth rate of the firm rather than shareholder value, they would undertake
capital expenditures  without  any cost of capital  considerations. Grabowski  and Mueller (1972)
have shown that this is especially true with regard to internal finance, since the scope for
managerial  discretion is maximum  here.  Reliance  on internal finance also helps managers  to
14build  financial  slack" 3 and  get  away  from  capital  market  pressures.  One  obvious  way  to
maximize internal  finance is by way of distributing  as little  dividends as possible.  In other
words,  managerial theory also predicts that firms with low dividend pay-out ratios are likely to
be most dependent on internal finance and least dependent on external finance.  Likewise,  the
agency-cost explanation for dividends offered by Rozeff (1982) and Easterbrook  (1984) predict
a negative relationship between dividend practices and  internal finance.  In their  view,  high
dividend pay-outs help to lower agency costs by minimizing the amount of free discretionary
cash flow  available  to the managers;  on the other hand,  low dividend  pay-outs  increase  the
agency costs associated with free cash flow.
These arguments are reversed in the case of firms with high dividend pay-out ratios. 14
These  considerations  therefore  imply  that  dividend  practices  are  not  sufficient  to
distinguish between information-theoretic and managerial approaches to the study of the firm's
financing choices.  As noted before,  this also marks a fundamental departure  for the present
study from the genre of studies following Fazzari et al. (1988) that view dividend practices as
the sole basis for  dealing with firm heterogeneity  in the context of the information-theoretic
approach to investment.
(c) exchange listing: Oliner and Rudebusch (1993) have proposed the use of the firm's  exchange
listing as an alternative measure of its maturity.  This is especially useful,  since the age of the
13 Financial  slack is defined as the difference  between internal  finance and capital expenditures  and
shows how far the firm can avoid external  finance while undertaking  capital expenditures.
"  It  should be emphasized that this relationship is not  merely a  restatement of the negative
relationship  between dividend pay-out and retained earnings (internal  finance) in an accounting  sense.
Note that Dividends +  Retained Earnings =  Net Income.  Therefore, (Dividends/Net  Income) +
(Retained  Earnings/Net  Income) =  1.  The argument here is basically about why internal finance as a
source of finance should matter for some types of firms.
15firm is not reported in COMPUSTAT. Exchange listing refers to whether the firm's common
stock trades over the counter (OTC) or on other stock exchanges like the New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE) or the American Stock Exchange (ASE)--non-OTC  firms.  When firms go
public initially, their stock is issued over the counter, as they usually cannot meet the listing
requirements of  the major exchanges." 3 According to the information-theoretic  approach,
compared  to non-OTC  firms, OTC firms are more likely to be less mature firms that may face
more  asymmetries of  information between managers and  outside suppliers of  finance.
Consequently,  OTC firms should  be most dependent  on internal finance and least dependent  on
external finance, holding everything  else constant.
Previous  research found that OTC firms tend  to experience  more asymmetric  information
than Fortune 500 companies because they are typically smaller, have more of their value in
intangible  assets, and receive less attention  from investment  analysts (Chari et al.  (1988), Lin
and Howe (1990)).
On the other hand, managerial  theory argues that since OTC firms are more likely to be
younger, smaller, and fast-growing,  agency costs are likely to be lower for them compared to
non-OTC firms.  Consequently,  OTC firms should be least dependent  on internal finance and
most dependent  on external finance. This prediction  is based  on the findings  of Mueller (1972).
While testing the life cycle theory of the firm, Mueller (1972)  has shown that young, dynamic
firms with attractive  investment  opportunities  are more likely to use external finance while  old,
mature firms with limited growth opportunities  are largely dependent  on internal finance.
15  Listing requirements  for NYSE currently include: a corporation must have a minimum  of one
million  publicly  held shares  with a minimum  aggregate  market  value of $16 million as well as net income
topping $2.5 million before federal income  tax.
16These arguments are reversed in the case of non-OTC  firms.
(d) R and D to sales ratio: According  to the information-theoretic  approach, asymmetries  of
information  between  insiders and outsiders are likely to be the greatest in the case of firms with
high R and D to sales ratios.  These firms should therefore be most dependent on internal
finance  and least dependent  on external finance.
For instance, Arrow (1962) has argued that moral hazard problems hinder the external
financing  of highly risky business activities  like innovation. More recently, Stiglitz and Weiss
(1981) and Myers and Majluff (1984) have developed formal models of moral hazard and
adverse selection in the context of external finance--debt  as well as equity--which  is especially
relevant for R and D investments. These problems  of adverse incentive  and selection  problems
are compounded  by the absence of collateral  value of investments  like R and D. 16
On the other hand, managerial  theory argues that conflicts between shareholders and
managers  are likely to be least for technologically  progressive, dynamic  firms with high R and
D to sales ratios and attractive  growth opportunities." 7 These firms should therefore be least
dependent  on internal finance and most dependent  on external finance.
These arguments are reversed in the case of mature firms with low R and D to sales
ratios.
Regression
The predictions  outlined above can be tested by running  regression eq. 1 shown below,
based on Fazzari et al. (1988), for two groups of firms divided on the basis of median  values
16 The importance  of collaterizable  net  worth  has been  emphasized  by Bernanke  and  Gertler  (1989),
among  others.
'' This prediction is based on Mueller's (1972) life cycle theory of the firm.
17of size and R and D to sales ratio;  firms have been also split on the basis of their  exchange
listing.  18
I/K  =  0+  OIQ  +  02  (CF/K) +  3 3(S/K) +  e  (1)
where Q is the q ratio,  CF is cash flows, S is sales, and K is the replacement cost of capital.
In this specification,  Q is regarded  as a measure of expected profitability,  CF is a measure of
the availability of funds, and S shows current demand conditions. 19 As noted before, this is also
a convenient strategy to distinguish between the role of cash  flows as a measure of expected
profitability  and  as  a  measure  of  the  availability  of  funds.  All  the  coefficients  in  this
specification are expected to be positive.
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Results
The empirical  results are based on a panel of 603 manufacturing  firms from the Standard
and Poor's COMPUSTAT  database for the 1972-1990  period; the sample  excludes firms that
were involved in major mergers representing  contribution  to sales exceeding  50 percent of the
acquiring  firm's net sales for the year in question. The q ratio has been  computed  following  the
methodology outlined in Salinger and Summers (1983).
Regressions20 were run for eq.  1 after splitting the sample on the basis of median values
's  Dividend pay-out ratio was not used to split the sample, since it is not useful in distinguishing
between managerial  and information-theoretic  approaches.
" It should be noted that in addition  to sales, Fazzari et al. (1988)  also used the desired capital  stock
term from neoclassical theory to model the demand side and still found the cash flow term to be
significant.
20 In general, the relationship  is specified  as
Yi, =  (3 +  XjX  +  ai  +  v, +  ei,  where ai is the individual firm effect and v, is the year
effect. The standard  approach  for sweeping  out fixed effects,  by transforming  variables  to deviations  from
18of size and R and D to sales ratio; firms were also divided  on the basis of their exchange  listing.
These results are shown in table 2.
(i) aU  rwms: For all firms, the right hand side variables  of the regression  are significant;  except
for sales, all the signs are as expected. As shown by Schiantarelli  and Gerogoutsos  (1990), the
negative sales coefficient could reflect the effect of  monopolistic markets rather than the
accelerator effects associated  with positive sales coefficients. 2'
(ii) size: Based  on median  values  of firm size, larger firms are much  more dependent  on internal
finance than smaller firms.  This provides broad support for the managerial approach to
investment  rather than the information-theoretic  approach. In the case of the small firms, sales--
proxying for future demand--does  not seem to be a factor, while it does matter for large firms.
Also, the q ratio is significant  for all firms, implying that future profitability does matter for
capital expenditures.
(iii) exchange  listing: The cash flow effect is much more important  and stronger for non-OTC
firms, compared to OTC firms.  This is  consistent with the predictions of the managerial
approach  and contrary to the information-theoretic  approach. For non-OTC  firms, sales and q
ratio matter, while they do not matter for OTC firms.
These results can also be viewed  as being consistent  with those based on size (ii) if one
thinks of OTC firms as being smaller than non-OTC firms.
(iv) R and D to sales ratio: In the case of firms divided  on the basis of median  R and D to sales
their  firm-specific  means,  has been  used  in this  paper.  These  estimates  are  also  referred  to as the "within-
group"  estimate  in the literature.  See  Hsiao  (1986)  for a more  detailed  discussion  of this approach.
21 Devereaux  and  Schiantarelli  (1990)  also  report  negative  output  coefficients.  However,  Fazzari  et
al. (1988)  and  Oliner  and  Rudebusch  (1992)  report  positive  sales  coefficients.
19ratio, mature firms are more dependent  on internal finance than dynamic firms.  This is again
consistent with the predictions of the managerial approach and counter to the information-
theoretic approach.
On balance  therefore, when firms are divided  on the basis of size, exchange  listing, and
R and D to sales ratio, the evidence  turns out to be more favorable  for the managerial  approach
compared to the information-theoretic  approach. In other words, the observed reliance of the
firm's capital expenditure  decisions  on internal finance is indeed driven by managerial  rather
than information-theoretic  considerations.  Therefore, the evidence in this paper is broadly
consistent  with the results of Blanchard  et al. (1994) who  adopt a somewhat  different approach
to distinguish  between the perfect capital markets model, asymmetric  information  model, and
the agency model of managerial  behavior and find the evidence  as favoring the agency model.
It is important  to emphasize  that these findings  connote an important  departure from the
findings in the literature following  the Fazzari et al. (1988) study. In these studies, the firm's
observed  reliance  on internal  finance  for investment  decisions  has been  attributed  to information-
theoretic considerations. However, as argued in this paper, this reliance on internal finance
could and in fact does stem from managerial-theoretic  considerations. As discussed  before, the
principal shortcoming  of the information-theoretic  literature is its reliance on dividend  practices
as the decisive criterion for studying firm heterogeneity.  However, this approach is flawed
because, as shown in the present paper, dividend practices are incapable of distinguishing
between managerial and information-theoretic  approaches, since both approaches predict a
negative relationship  between dividend pay-out ratios and capital expenditures. On the other
hand, variables such as size, exchange listing, and R and D to sales ratio are adequate to
20distinguish  between managerial  and information-theoretic  approaches  since it is possible  to make
contrasting  predictions  for the firm's reliance on internal finance for capital  expenditures  based
on these variables.
Regressions  with interactions  (tables 3, 4)
The issue of firm heterogeneity  can be explored further by running regressions that
include an interaction term between cash flow and firm characteristics.  In particular, this
approach is useful in checking the consistency  of the regression results shown in table 2 and
discussed in the previous section.  The new results are shown in table 3.
The interaction of  size with cash flow is significant  and positive.  This is therefore
consistent  with the earlier finding that large firms are more dependent  on intemal finance. The
interaction term between exchange listing'  and cash flow is negative and significant.  This
implies that OTC firms are less dependent  on internal finance than non-OTC firms.  This is
similar to the evidence noted before and consistent with the predictions of the managerial
approach  and counter to the information-theoretic  approach. The interaction  between the R and
D to sales ratio and cash flow is not significant. These conclusions  are also not changed when
all the interactions are considered simultaneously  except that the R and D interaction term
becomes negative and significant  and therefore lends more support for the managerial  theory
(table 4).
Therefore, the evidence  from regressions  with interactions  reinforce the earlier findings
from regressions  based  on splitting  the sample  using firm  characteristics. These results therefore
22 In this specification,  exchange  listing  is proxied  by a dummy  variable  that takes on a value of one
for OTC firms and zero for non-OTC  firms.
21suggest that the observed reliance of the firm's investment on intemal finance is driven by
managerial  rather than information-theoretic  considerations.
Conclusions  and Discussion
While the positive relationship  between intemal finance and investment  is a well-known
fact in economic  research, the analytical  basis for the underlying  cashflow theory has been an
unresolved  issue. Beginning  with Fazzari et al. (1988), the consensus  in the literature seems to
be that the firm's  observed reliance on internal finance for capital expenditures is due to
information-theoretic  considerations. However, as demonstrated  in this paper, this reliance on
internal finance could, and in fact does, stem from managerial-theoretic  considerations. In that
sense, the findings in this paper connote a fundamental departure from the evidence in the
literature so far.  The principal shortcoming  of the information-theoretic  literature  is its reliance
on dividend  practices as the decisive  criterion for studying firm heterogeneity. However, this
approach  is flawed  because  dividend  practices  are incapable  of distinguishing  between  managerial
and information-theoretic  approaches, since both approaches predict a  negative relationship
between dividend  pay-out ratios and capital  expenditures. On the other hand, variables such as
size, exchange  listing, and R and D to sales ratio are adequate  to distinguish  between managerial
and information-theoretic  approaches  since it is possible  to make contrasting  predictions  for the
firm's reliance on internal finance for capital expenditures  based on these variables.  Finally,
the results in this paper are broadly consistent  with that of Blanchard  et al. (1994)  that examined
a variety of firm decisions  to distinguish  between  alternative  theories of corporate financing  and
investment and found support for the agency model of managerial behavior rather than the
perfect capital markets model and the asymmetric  information  model.
22What then are  the implications of  these findings for developing countries?  It  is
interesting  to start this discussion by noting that the empirical testing of the altemative models
of investment  in developing  countries have been confined  to accelerator, neoclassical,  and the
cash flow models.  The Q theory of investment has not been in this mix given the rather
exacting data requirements  for the computation  of the Q ratio.  Overall, the evidence for the
developing  countries have favored the cash flow theory of investment.  2
While there exists no current research that directly  distinguishes  between managerial  and
information-theoretic  approaches  that underpin  the cash flow theory  of investment  for developing
countries, there are some interesting  pointers.  For instance, based on a detailed comparison  of
U. S. and Indian firms, Samuel  (1996)  has shown  that apriori, information  and agency  problems
are likely to be less severe for Indian firms compared to U. S. firms, given that the Indian
financial system is predominantly  a bank-oriented one compared to the U.  S. stock market-
oriented system.  Further, the analysis of the financing of project costs for existing and new
Indian firms suggested  that internal finance  and debentures  played  a much  greater role in project
financing for  existing firms,  while external equity and  loans  from All-India Financial
Institutions' played a much greater role for new companies. Since agency costs are likely to
23 See  Athey  and  Laumas  (1994)  for India,  Harris  et al. (1994)  for Indonesia,  Jaramillo  et al. (1993a,
1993b)  for Ecuador,  Nabi (1989)  for Pakistan,  and Tybout  (1983)  for Colombia. Also, Bilsborrow
(1977)  found  support  for accelerator  and cash  flow  theories  using  panel  data  for manufacturing  firms  in
Colombia.
24 There are three All-India  Development  Banks:  Industrial  Development  Bank  of India (IDBI),
Industrial  Finance  Corporation  of  India  (IFCI),  and  Industrial  Credit  and  Investment  Corporation  of  India
(ICICI). In addition  to IFCI, ICICI, and IDBI, Industrial  Reconstruction  Bank  of India (IRBI)  also
provides  long-term  finance  to Indian  corporations.  Unit  trust  of  India  (UTI),  Life  Insurance  Corporation
of India  (LIC),  and  General  Insurance  Corporation  of India  (GIC)  also  provide  financial  assistance  and
take  equity  positions  in Indian  companies.  In addition,  there  are state-level  financial  institutions  (SFCs,
SIDCs)  that  provide  long-term  finance  to Indian  companies.
23be greater for existing firms than new firms, the greater reliance of existing firms on internal
finance  can be viewed  as broadly  supportive  of the managerial  theory of investment  in the Indian
context.  In contrast, the information-theoretic  approach to investment would have predicted
existing firms to  be less dependent on internal finance than new firms since information
problems are likely to be less for existing firms than new firms.
This finding is also consistent  with the evidence  in Singh and Hamid (1992), Athey and
Laumas (1994), and Cobham  and Subramniam  (1995)  who find internal finance to be relatively
more important  for large Indian firms than small firms.  Given that existing firms are likely to
be bigger than new firms (that are usually small), this result can be seen as strengthening  the
case for the managerial  theory of investment  in the Indian context. Further, Athey and Laumas
(1994) found internal finance to me more important  for firms that produce luxury goods than
essential goods.  Given that R and D expenditures  for firms producing luxury goods are likely
to be lower than for firms producing  essential goods and given that agency costs are likely to
be higher as well, this evidence  again seems to support the managerial  theory of investment  in
the Indian case.
It is also interesting  to consider the implications  of these results for the efficiency  of the
overall resource  allocation  process  in the economy,  where  efficiency  can be measured  by the rate
of return on investment. Under the neoclassical  theory of investment,  the return on investment
for firms with different mixes of intemal and extemal finance should be similar since internal
and external finance are regarded as substitutes. In contrast, under the cash flow theories--the
managerial and information-theoretic  approaches--the return on  investment by  firms with
different mixes of internal and extemal finance should  be different, since intemal and extemal
24finance  are not considered  substitutes. In particular, firms that use external capital  markets and
hence are subject to their discipline  could be expected to utilize resources more efficiently  than
firms that are  more reliant on internal finance; this is also known as the  "capital market
pressure" hypothesis  in the literature.  Jensen (1986) argues that the constant scrutiny by the
capital  market is an efficiency-enhancing  device  that keeps managerial  discretion to a minimum,
best exemplified  perhaps by leveraged  buy-outs.  In the extreme, there are firms that fund all
investment  out of internal finance alone as well as firms that use external finance consistently.
Samuel (1995) has investigated  the relationship  between returns on investment  and the
financing  mix of firms. The evidence  from the regressions  supported  the predictions  of the cash
flow theories in that firms that were more dependent  on external finance attained higher rates
of return on investments  than firms that were more dependent on internal finance.  To that
extent, these results support the capital  market pressure hypothesis  and therefore implies  that the
overall resource allocation  process is likely to be efficient. In other words, even though firms
are primarily  dependent  on internal  finance  and therefore  are not subject  to the constant  scrutiny
of capital markets that would have come from a greater reliance on external finance, the
attendant  resource allocation  process is none the less efficient. Again, from the perspective of
developing  countries, this result suggests  that even though the stock market plays a limited  role
as a source of finance 25, policy initiatives to reform the financial sector and develop capital
markets can enhance  the overall efficiency  of the resource allocation  process in the economy.
However, there is a caveat to this conclusion. As noted earlier, while the information-
theoretic approach is based on the premise that managers maximize shareholder value, the
25 See  Samuel  (1996)  and Cobham  and  Subramaniam  (1995)  for evidence  regarding  India.
25managerial approach assumes that managers are  more  interested in  objectives like sales
maximization,  size of the firm, and perquisites  rather than the market value of the firm.  Given
that the results in this paper support the managerial approach than the information-theoretic
approach, it could well be that overinvestment  by old, mature firms could displace  investment
by young, dynamic firms at or above the market discount rate.  Consequently,  the allocation  of
resources in the economy implied by the managerial  theory of investment can be considered
inefficient  from the point of view of social welfare. 26
26 See  Mueller  (1972)  and Friedman  and  Laibson  (1989)  for a more  detailed  discussion.
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31Table 1: Predicted relationship between internal finance and capital expenditures
Firm characteristics  Information-theoretic  Managerial approach
approach
Size
--Large  Negative  Positive
--Small  Positive  Negative
Dividend pay-out ratio
--High  Negative  Negative
--Low  Positive  Positive
Exchange  listing
--OTC firms  Positive  Negative
--Non-OTC firms  Negative  Positive
R and D to sales ratio
--High  Positive  Negative
--Low  Negative  Positive
Table  2: Firm characteristics and investment
Al  Size of the  firm  Exchange  listing  R  and  D to sales
ruins  ratio
Small  Large  OTC  Non-  Low  High
_  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _O  T C
NT  11457  5738  5719  1824  9633  3155  4197
Q  0.0004  0.0002  0.006  0.002  0.005  0.005  0.001
(2.88)  (1.67)  (9.35)  (1.04)  (9.75)  (4.11)  (4.35)
S/K  -0.003  -0.001  -0.014  -0.00001  -0.008  -0.014  0.002
l_________  (-2.45)  (-0.68)  (-6.27)  (-0.002)  (-5.70)  (-4.98)  (0.91)
CF/K  0.076  0.056  0.146  0.036  0.112  0.148  0.024
(12.95)  (8.17)  (11.00)  (3.73)  (12.97)  (8.15)  (4.84)
Adjusted
lr,  10.036  0.033  0.075  0 031  0.054  0.051  0.047
Notes: Q is the ratio of the market value to replacement costs, S/K is the ratio of sales to capital
stock,  CF/K is the ratio of cash flows to capital stock.
The cash flow measure includes R and D expenditures when the sample is divided on the basis
of the R and D to sales ratio.
The regressions include fixed firm and year effects.
t-statistics are shown in parentheses.Table 3: Internal rmance  and investment: Regressions with interactions
Size of the frw  Exchange listing  R and D to sales
ratio
NT  11457  11457  11457  11457  11457  11457
Q  0.0004  0.0004  0.0004  0.0005  0.0004  0.0004
(2.88)  (2.90)  (2.88)  (3.57)  (2.97)  (2.95)
S/K  -0.003  -0.003  -0.003  -0.005  -0.003  -0.003
(-2.45)  (-2.65)  (-2.45)  (-3.53)  (-1.58)  (-1.62)
CF/K  0.076  0.073  0.076  0.128  0.061  0.061
I_____________  (12.95)  (12.43)  (12.95)  (15.29)  (9.73)  (9.75)
Size*(CF/K)  0.0002
_  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  (7 .13)  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
Exch.list. *  -0.087
(CF/K)  (-8.70)  I
R and D*  0.000001
(CF/K)  (0.66)
Adjusted r_  0.036  0.040  0.036  0.042  0.043  0.043
Notes: Q is the ratio of the market value to replacement  costs, S/K is the ratio of sales to capital
stock, CF/K is the ratio of cash flows to capital stock. (Size*CF/K),  (Exch.list.*CF/K), and (R
and D.*CF/K) are interaction  terms.
The cash flow measure includes  R and D expenditures  when the sample is divided on the basis
of the R and D to sales ratio.
The regressions  include fixed firm and year effects.
t-statistics  are shown in parentheses.Table 4: Internal  finance and investment:  Regressions  with interactions
_  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  ~~I  U
NT  7352  7352
Q  0.0004(2.97)  0.0005(3.53)
S/K  -0.003(-1.58)  -0.004(-2.48)
CF/K  0.061(9.73)  0.124(12.06)
Size*(CF/K)  0.00002(5.37)
Exch.list.*(CF/K)  -0.092(-8.17)
R and D*(CF/K)  -0.0001(-1.97)
Adjusted r 2 0.043  0.057
Notes: Q is the ratio of the market  value to replacement  costs, S/K is the ratio of sales to capital
stock, CF/K is the ratio of cash flows to capital  stock. (Size*CF/K),  (Exch.list.  *CF/K), and (R
and D.*CF/K) are interaction  terms.
The cash flow measure includes R and D expenditures  in the (2) regression.
The regressions include fixed firm and year effects.
t-statistics are shown in parentheses.Policy Research Working Paper Series
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